Ramesses II: Anatomy of a Pharaoh
The Military Leader
Were
we to take the depictions and reliefs of Ramesses II, Seti
I, there successors and their predecessors at face value,
it might lead us to sometimes believe that their contact with
neighbors was always on the field of battle. Many of these
reliefs on the exterior of temple walls portray war as both
thrilling and glamorous, having also religious undertones.
On these walls we are, repeatedly, almost like the high budget
advertisements of our modern society, treated to scenes of
the king vanquishing the enemy and thus fulfilling his duty
to defeat the forces of chaos and preserve ma'at. Again and
again, we see the brave pharaoh driving his chariot behind
fiery steeds as he fearlessly leads his nervous troops into
the fray. He stands single handedly sometimes in his two man
chariot alone, firing arrows as he charges ahead, or at other
times, beats his cringing enemies to death with a club.
The message is clear. Pharaoh triumphant
sacrifices his enemies to the greater glory of Egypt and her
gods. The Defeated enemy invariably adopts an attitude of
total submission, for he knows that it would be futile to
struggle against his fate. These enemies very often included
the Nubians to the south of Egypt, the Libyans to Egypt's
west and the 
Asiatics
to the east. They appear again and again to suffer at the
hands of pharaohs, as depicted on temple walls, even when
they were not a threat.
No one was better at this propaganda
than Ramesses the Great, who always won his wars and always
forced his enemies to grovel at his feet. For example, even
though many scholars believe he lost ground with the Battle
of Kadesh, he nevertheless had no fewer than ten inscriptions,
a longer "poem" and a shorter "bulletin" carved on the walls
of five temples, along with accompanying reliefs. These, of
course, all depicted Ramesses II victorious, but few of these
accounts conform to our modern standards of historic reporting.
In fact, some battles depicted by later pharaohs, were actually
campaigns of earlier kings whom the current pharaoh wished
to emulate, while others depicted kings such as Amenhotep
III and his son, Akhenaten smiting enemies when in fact they
probably never personally participated in military actions
at all.
An
examination of Ramesses II's campaigns, as depicted on the
walls of his various temples, seems to show that his military
leadership was not overly impressive, if stripped of their
hyperbole. If the Battle of Kadesh, his most documented campaign,
is any indication, he was almost certainly an unimaginative
strategist who was better as a front line warrior than as
a military leader. We must give him credit for his personal
involvement in a number of campaigns, as well as his good
intentions, and he did expand Egypt's territory, even in southern
Syria. Because of the peace treaty with the Hittites, he was
also able to use these possessions to increase the wealth
of Egypt.
Just as the Egyptian temple walls
were a fortress against the chaos of the secular world protecting
the peace, or ma'at within, so too were Egypt's borders. The
Two Lands (Egypt) might also be viewed in a certain way as
a temple to the Egyptian gods, for pharaoh ruled the world.
He had an religious duty to protect its borders from the corrupt
and vile foreigners. So from a fairly early age, Ramesses,
as the future pharaoh, was trained in the art of warfare.
We know that he probably accompanied his father, Seti I on
some of his campaigns, and as he grew older, was placed in
charge of various military actions.
In fact, when Egypt's ships and northernmost
towns suddenly found themselves under serious threat by pirates
(Sherden),
it was Ramesses II, while still co-regent in one of his earliest
actions as a commander, who was placed in charge of their
elimination. Posting soldiers and ships at strategic points
along the coast, Ramesses II waited patiently until the Sherden
appeared. He surprised and captured them, inducting many of
their survivors into the Egyptian army. While the Battle of
Kadesh often dominates the scholarly view of Ramesses II's
military prowess, he nevertheless did enjoy more than a few
outright victories over the enemies of Egypt.
Ramesses II must be applauded for
his protection of Egypt proper's borders. After all, this
was one of pharaoh's prime directives. Not long after he neutralized
the threat posed by Sherden pirates, he established a defensive
line along Egypt's northwestern frontier. Archaeologists have
identified at least three of these forts to the west of the
modern city of Alexandria, and another two in the western
Delta at Tell Abqa'in and Kom el-Hisn. These were probably
only a part of an extensive chain of forts protecting Egypt's
northwestern regions.
While not a new innovation, these
forts which were often built near water holes in order to
deny access to Libyans infiltrating the prosperous Delta,
probably became very useful when, during the reigns of several
of his successors (Merenptah and Ramesses III), Libyans attempted
a larger scale invasion into the region.
Yet,
Ramesses II's military aspirations were to the east, and for
good reason. Since Nubia was virtually a province of Egypt
during his reign, and there was little to be gained to Egypt's
west, imperial gains could really only be realized in southern
Syria. During the Old and Middle Kingdoms there were occasional
campaigns against specific fortified Canaanite towns, but
Egypt's real involvement with the region was in trade. In
fact, so important was this trade to the Canaanites, that
after the collapse of Egypt's Old Kingdom, the Canaanite economy
failed as well. However, it was not until the New Kingdom,
following Ahmose's expulsion of the Hyksos, that Egypt's military
attention became focused on southern Syria. By the time of
Tuthmosis III, Egypt would see its greatest expansion into
southern Syria. However, Egypt never seems to have been very
committed to this expansion, or perhaps more correctly, their
strategy for holding the region was faulty. There was never
a sizable, permanent Egyptian military presence committed
to the region. Instead, Egypt depended on the loyalty of local
chiefs to oversee their interests, which soon became an undependable
means of controlling the region. Egypt would be repeatedly
required to mount military campaigns into southern Syria in
order to hold, or as often as not, prevent the total collapse
of these holdings.
This
weakness in Egypt's strategic goals were never clearer than
in the reign of Ramesses II's father, Seti I. He seems to
have had considerable military success in the region, probably
for a brief time, increasing Egypt's expansion almost to the
extent of his early 18th Dynasty predecessors. This may have
included most of southern Syria, as far north as Kadesh. Yet,
by the time of his death, much of that territory was lost,
and there is no doubt that Ramesses II sought to return it
to Egyptian hands.
As early as the forth year of Ramesses
II's rule, the important kingdom of Amurru was returned to
Egyptian hands, but this also signaled a great battle to come,
for it would ultimately result in the Battle of Kadesh, an
action that Ramesses II claimed as a victory, but which most
Egyptologists see, at best, as a draw between the Hittites
and Egypt. It resulted in a peace treaty that, while excluding
the city state of Kadesh which Ramesses II had sought to control,
nevertheless allowed a measure of peace and prosperity throughout
the remainder of Ramesses II's reign.
Major Sections on Ramesses II: